A major lesson learned from the public health response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic was the need to shorten the vaccine delivery timeline to achieve the best pandemic mitigation results. A gap analysis of previous pre-pandemic vaccine development activities identified possible changes in the Select Agent exclusion process that would maintain safety and shorten the timeline to develop candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) for use in pandemic vaccine manufacture. Here, we review the biosafety characteristics of CVVs developed in the past 15 years to support a shortened preparedness timeline for A(H5) and A(H7) subtype highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) CVVs. Extensive biosafety experimental evidence supported recent changes in the implementation of Select Agent regulations that eliminated the mandatory chicken pathotype testing requirements and expedited distribution of CVVs to shorten prepandemic and pandemic vaccine manufacturing by up to 3 weeks.
of licensed influenza vaccines depends on a high level of structural similarity between the hemagglutinins (HA) of vaccine and circulating viruses. Therefore, pandemic vaccines with structurally well-matched HA antigens must be produced and administered as soon as possible after an emerging pandemic is detected. The National Pandemic Influenza Strategy calls for the United States (US) Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to maintain an updated library of CVVs and a strategic stockpile of vaccines to protect critical infrastructure in a pandemic emergency. 2 The Pandemic Influenza Plan 2017 Update includes expectations for DHHS and its partners to maintain a high level of readiness to start immunizing the US population with a well-matched pandemic vaccine within 4 months of a pandemic declaration. 3 Achieving this challenging pandemic vaccination goal requires aggressive time management in all vaccine development and manufacturing steps, including rapid development of a pandemic CVV and its immediate distribution to vaccine manufacturers by the World Health Organization and its (international) partners.
| PREPAR ATI ON AND D IS TRIBUTI ON OF C V VS AG AIN S T HPAI TO MAN UFAC TURER S
Most of the influenza vaccine supply for the United States is produced by growing viruses in embryonated chicken eggs. Pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines for HPAI viruses developed using these technologies must be produced using attenuated CVV seeds that support worker safety during manufacturing. 4 CVVs derived from HPAI viruses for pandemic influenza preparedness (PIP) are generated using reverse genetic technology to remove the multibasic amino acid motif from the cleavage site of the HA, which is the major determinant of high pathogenicity in chickens; that is, HPAI virus. [5] [6] [7] [8] Attenuated CVVs (with a monobasic amino acid HA cleavage site) are engineered by reverse genetics and characterized at public health laboratories under quality system regulations in compliance with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and World Health Organization (WHO) guidance and subsequently transferred to vaccine manufacturers for development of vaccine virus seeds per current good manufacturing practice (cGMP) standards. [9] [10] [11] [12] Currently, possession and transportation of wild-type HPAI viruses in the United States are regulated under Select Agent rules (CFR 9 part 121) by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Agricultural Select Agent Program. 13 Furthermore, CVVs that are engineered with the attenuating monobasic HA cleavage site of an HPAI virus were considered Select Agents. However, CVVs with multibasic-deleted HA can be used at a lower Biosafety Level after exclusion from the Select Agent list per CFR9 121.3e guidance. 14 Figure 1A ). This article describes the rationale and benefits of recent policy changes in the regulation of Select Agents in relation to development of CVVs for pandemic influenza preparedness and response purposes. 15 
| DHH S PANDEMIC VACCINE RE S P ON S E PL AN
A major lesson learned from the public health response to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic resulted from the unexpected early start (August 2009) of the second wave of virus circulation and disease occurring approximately 6-8 weeks before vaccination started (October 5, 2009), thereby weakening the impact of vaccination on reduction of disease burden. 16 Shortening the timeline for development of CVVs for HPAI viruses would improve the timeliness of future pandemic vaccine deployments in response to an emerging HPAI that is easily transmitted among humans. To this end, the US Select Agent Program received requests to expedite pandemic vaccine development and production by improving operational plans TA B L E 1 Biosafety risk assessment of pandemic CVV for exclusion from Select Agents list 14, 54 
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Genomic composition
Source of all genes in construct; description of modification that CVVs be treated as SA (requiring additional specific approved forms and shipping requirements) until intravenous chicken pathogenicity testing showed attenuation and these data were submitted to USDA as part of SA exclusion process 18 ( Figure 1A ). The pathogenicity results in chickens inoculated by the intravenous route, and other virus characterization data were included in the SA exclusion request submitted to the USDA Select Agent Program. With tight coordination and favorable circumstances, the animal studies performed after completion of CVV stock production in the laboratory added approximately 3-5 weeks to the timeline to finalize the SA exclusion process ( Figure 1A ). If vaccine manufacturers could receive CVVs designed to protect against the emerging HPAI viruses immediately after SA exclusion based on the viruses' in vitro characterization is completed, the first doses of vaccine could be available for pandemic mitigation several weeks sooner. Therefore, expedited alternative approaches to assess the biosafety of CVVs derived from HPAI viruses were prioritized by the relevant federal government agencies.
| B I OSAFE T Y RECORD OF C V V S SINCE 2 0 0 4
The regulatory policy framework for conducting biosafety risk assessment supporting Agricultural Select Agent (ASA) exclusion of CVVs against HPAI was initially developed in 2003-2004 and published in 2005. 13 Although early studies showed that viruses engineered with a monobasic HA cleavage site equivalent to that of LPAI viruses were avirulent in chickens, it was not clear whether this approach would consistently yield viruses from diverse lineages with a similar safety profile, 5,6,19-22 particularly when applied to newly emerged HPAI viruses. Therefore, newly developed CVVs are regulated by the USDA as ASA per 9CFR 121 13 and subsequently excluded from the ASA list following a prescribed regulatory pathway.
Exclusion from the USDA ASA list per CFR9 121.3e was based on in vitro and in vivo characterization data. The Select Agent regulations implemented in 2005 required intravenous challenge study in chickens, which entailed intravenous (IV) inoculation of CVV stock into 10 chickens, 6 weeks of age, to determine morbidity and mortality per OIE protocol with intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) < 1.2, or intravenous inoculation into eight chickens, 4-to-8 weeks of age, with mortality less than 75% for exclusion from Select Agent rule. 18, 23 In vitro characterization data inform three risk elements, as follows: 
the phenotypic character of avirulence in chickens ( Table 2) . 33 Taken together, these studies strongly support the absolute necessity of a basic amino acid cluster or insertion of additional amino acids at the cleavage site to impart high virulence for chickens to reassortant viruses with PR8 genetic background. 
| B I OSAFE T Y RIS K A SS E SS MENT FOR

| Mitigating residual virulence risk
The body of knowledge on the biological properties of PIP CVVs in chickens has increased by at least an order of magnitude since the original CVV regulatory framework was established in the United States more than a decade ago 13 ( These findings are consistent with the well-established importance of the multibasic and/or elongated cleavage site of the HA (molecular marker) for plaque formation in the absence of trypsin (in vitro marker) and the high virulence in chickens (in vivo IVPI). [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] The abundance of data indicates that H5/H7 CVV with monobasic cleavage site and trypsin-dependent plaque phenotype would have a negligible potential to cause severe disease in chickens. 26, 46 All product-contact and raw materials are pre-qualified to be free of pathogenic infectious agents. It is worth noting that the use of synthetic DNA, which has been used increasingly in the generation of CVVs, results in the absence of wild-type HPAI HA genes in the production facility. Therefore, the risk of introducing a HPAI virus into the CVV production environment is extremely low to nearly zero. That said, a set of tests are performed after each CVV is produced to identify signals inconsistent with those that define the CVV as similar to LPAI viruses (Table 3) (Table A1 ). 51 To this end, groups of 8 to 10 birds were inocu- 5 These phenotypic differences are expected to result in rapid elimination of CVVs from exposed poultry because the reproductive number would be substantially lower than 1 (R 0 < 1). 53 These data indicate that PIP CVVs against HPAI with a PR8 backbone pose minimal risk to the health and well-being of poultry and other birds.
| Mitigating the risk of reversion to high virulence
| Mitigating risk of laboratory contamination with wild-type HPAI
| REGULATORY POLICY REVIEW TO IMPROVE PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AND PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSES
A large number of CVVs with HA sequences from HPAI viruses engineered with a monobasic cleavage site have been generated and characterized in the past 14 years. Invariably, they showed loss of replicative fitness and virulence in chickens. This body of information provided a compelling basis to re-evaluate the contribution of in vivo studies in chickens to virulence assessment of future CVVs prepared according to equivalent methods and protocols. In addition, the array of risk mitigation practices for production and characterization of PIP Testing by next-generation sequencing (NGS) has become standard practice for CVV characterization in 2016, adding sensitivity to the risk mitigation program (lower analytical limit of detection).
TA B L E 3 Biosafety risks and mitigation strategies for PIP CVV production and use swine (H1 and H3) influenza A viruses have zoonotic potential, they are not subject to Select Agent rules. However, the same scientific process to reduce virulence and transmissibility for agricultural animals by utilizing the PR8 backbone could be incorporated in public health and veterinary medical CVV risk assessment process to determine whether fewer enhancements are needed at BSL-2 than would be required for wild-type parent viruses, especially for parent viruses of foreign origin.
The recently updated policy governing PIP CVV development 15, 54 
TA B L E A 1 Replication and shedding characteristics of H5 and H7 CVVs in chickens by intranasal inoculation a
